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Dual Citizenship in Athens and Jerusalem: Ricoeur's Hermeneutics and the Promise of 
Lutheran Higher Education 
Mark C. Mattes 
Beyond the desert of criticism we seek to be called again. -Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil. 
In contrast with other Christian approaches to the 
question of the relationship between faith and learning, 
which tend either to isolate faith from learning or to over­
accentuate a continuum between them, the Lutheran 
approach to Christian higher education seeks to develop a 
conversation between faith and learning that preserves 
the integrity of each and can address current secularistic 
biases that would inhibit the attempt to establish a 
dialogue between faith and learning. In an attempt to 
flesh out a model of dialogue that can help us better 
understand how to model a faith-based approach to 
higher education, one can look to the work of the 
contemporary French philosopher and theorist of 
language and interpretation, Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur's 
work can provide a model for discerning various 
phenomenological elements of dialogue (such as 
listening, risk, open-endedness, and mutuality), offer a 
framework from within a "neutral" or non-faith 
perspective for making the dialogue between faith and 
learning a plausible and worthwhile endeavor, and show 
how education as a process is a profoundly hermeneutical 
task. His understanding of myth as an indispensable 
category for interpreting human behavior, truth primarily 
as manifestation and not correspondence, and 
secularism's ability to dehumanize people calls for a 
retrieval of a faith-based approach to education congenial 
to the Lutheran tradition. Himself a layman of the French 
Reformed Church, Ricoeur offers work that should help 
us clarify the educational dynamics that can be operative 
at Lutheran-related schools. 
In response to the dynamics of disengagement outlined 
by Marsden and Burtchaell, we need to maintain that 
Christian higher education should indeed attempt in a 
specifiable way to integrate faith and learning across the 
curriculum and in various facets of student life. 
Admittedly, a school is not a church-nor should it be. A 
school is a community of scholars seeking to further the 
life of the mind. However, the unique heritage and 
calling of church-related institutions of higher learning is 
to attempt to find ways for faith and learning to connect. 
This is a task unique to the church-related school, since it 
11; not promoted by secular institutions or by other 
agencies of the church. If we conceive of this integration 
as a conversation between faith and learning, we can 
recognize that both questions addressed to the faith from 
outside of faith and questions arising from the faith to 
that which is outside of faith are permitted and 
encouraged as essential components in the development 
of the life of the mind. In other words, unlike much 
secular-based education, Lutheran higher education 
proposes that questions of faith are worthy of one's 
reflection; and, in contrast to many sectarian Christian 
institutions, at Lutheran colleges and universities it is 
permissible--indeed sometimes necessary-to criticize 
our presuppositions of faith in the hope of refining our 
faith-inspired perspectives. Admittedly, this task is risky 
for faith. We might lose our faith in the process of self­
criticism. Nevertheless, as it will be seen, if we follow 
Luther's and/or Ricoeur's thinking, a faith that insists on 
security of whatever sort proves not to be genuine faith at 
all.1
In some perspectives in higher education, faith issues and 
questions are thought to be solely a private matter. In this 
view, scholars want to preserve human autonomy from 
the threat of authoritarianism and defend scientific 
research from the challenge of "obscuritanism." Hence, 
in their view, faith is an irrational disposition or blind 
acceptance of the religious legitimization of social 
institutions. By contrast, for church-related higher 
education, faith issues are thought to engage the life of 
the mind and even challenge our assumptions about 
social legitimization. Faith issues are permitted to be 
public, even though these issues will not receive univocal 
answers from church-related faculties, whose views often 
reflect the pluralism of the wider academy. Hence, 
church-related colleges should seek to foster both 
academic excellence and spiritual growth, and not just 
provide opportunities for spiritual growth. How might 
this be possible in an academic environment? Issues of 
faith are nurtured as much, if not more so, by the 
questions that faith raises, and not merely by the historic 
creedal or confessional answers that faith has 
traditionally given. Indeed, the very transmission of faith 
has been sustained by the questions generated by the 
faithful. Hence, one should agree with former St. Olaf 
College president Mark Edwards that "there should be in 
most cases no substantive difference between scholarship 
by Christians and by non-Christians." However, one can 
assume that the pedagogy at church-related campuses at 
times might be markedly different from that at secular 
campuses, since the church-related community of 
scholars will expect and encourage questions about 
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various disciplines, methods, and subject matters that 
might address faith or be addressed by faith. In church­
related colleges, a confessional tradition meets the wider 
world of scholarship: this encounter mixes not the 
ingredients of oppression or repression, but of lively 
debate. Of course, one should not assume that religion 
courses required for the baccalaureate degree by many 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) 
schools will guarantee that faith and learning will be 
cross-fertilized. As an academic discipline, the study of 
religion in a church-related school may be done, indeed 
perhaps often ought to be done, from a vantage point of 
critical distance from faith, a "second order" reflection on 
"first order" faith propositions. However, such critical 
distance should never quiet questions of faith for the very 
sake of achieving an alleged "academic freedom" in the 
classroom. There is no wholly neutral stance in which 
scholars do their work. Scholars are always framed by 
traditions or perspectives. In a church-related 
environment, questions and issues of faith are, ironically, 
a guarantee of the pursuit of academic freedom across the 
curriculum, since they are not dismissed out of hand due 
to secularistic bias. 
The integration of faith and learning can happen and 
often occurs in the outreach programs of campus ministry 
centers at state and/or secular universities and colleges or 
by various groups within currently demarcated research 
arms of the academy. However, church-related colleges 
ought to endeavor to bring faith and learning into 
conversation in an intentional way in their many 
endeavors and venues. From the perspective of 
democratic ideals and free inquiry, such a goal in no way 
jeopardizes the autonomy or academic freedom of faculty 
or students, since all members of a church-related 
academic community have freely consented to the value 
of this endeavor by their joining this particular 
community of scholars. Hence, as suggested by 
Ricoeur' s thinking, the atmosphere that ought to be 
fostered on church-related campuses would avoid, on the 
one hand, a skepticism that thinks that it is pointless to 
seek truth or, in this case, the integration of faith and 
learning, and, on the other hand, a dogmatism in which 
one presumes to have discovered the definitive truth so 
that no further questions need be asked.2 Rather, church­
related higher education can foster an attitude of 
hopefulness that faith can provide a vision of meaning, 
meaningfulness, and even truth in and for the academy as 
it inspires students to consider lives of dedicated service 
to the world. Church-related higher education ought to 
produce graduates who understand the responsibilities of 
dual citizenship in both Athens and Jerusalem. The 
skeptic needs to take the risk of questing for meaning in 
inherited symbols, despite these symbol's limitations, 
while the dogmatist needs to see his or her symbols 
appropriately critiqued. 
The Lutheran Approach to Christian Higher 
Education 
As several scholars have argued, different Christian 
traditions have tended to construe the relationship 
between faith and learning in different ways. 3 The 
Reformed tradition has tended to integrate faith and 
learning by subordinating learning to faith in order to 
construct a unified and coherent single understanding of 
reality, a purported "Christian worldview" since, after all, 
all truth is God's truth. A consistent Reformed position 
tends to be alarmed by the threat of secularization, since 
it will attribute secularization as resistance to the 
distinctive Christian perspective.4 The Roman Catholic 
perspective tends to emphasize continuity between faith 
and reason since it is apt to construe the material world in 
virtually a "sacramental" way as a vehicle of God's grace 
and presence. The Mennonite and/or "free church" 
traditions emphasize not so much a distinctive Christian 
understanding of the world as distinctive Christian 
behavior-radical discipleship--a personal, practical, 
and unique discipline as over against the world. While 
appreciating the desire to relate faith and learning found 
in all these approaches and, in fact, sensing a core of truth 
in all of them, Lutheran higher education resists the 
attempt to impose a "Christian worldview" on the world, 
or the desire to insulate itself from the world, or the 
supposition that there is an uncontested continuum 
between faith and learning. Perhaps less confident in our 
ability to interpret either our world or God's truth for the 
world than these other perspectives, Lutheran higher 
education tends to see its mission as establishing a 
dialogue between faith and learning for the sake of 
mentoring citizens who will serve both church and 
society. The integration of faith and learning in a 
Lutheran perspective, then, suggests thematizing a 
conversation between the implications of faith for 
learning and the implications of the various disciplines in 
the arts and sciences for faith, when and where it is 
appropriate. 
A conversation between faith and learning should not be 
misconstrued as one between public (learning) and 
private matters (faith issues). It is not an exercise in 
"values clarification." Rather, it involves the "to and fro" 
or "give and take" movement in a dialogue generated by 
two sets of possibilities: those of new life granted by the 
gospel as they bear upon the life of the mind, and those of 
the life of the mind as they bear upon our comprehension 
of the gospel. A Lutheran approach to higher education 
is guided by an affinnation that the world is properly 
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God's, not our own, and that this truth liberates us from 
any pretentiousness towards divinity that we might foster. 
As people of faith, we can be free to accept our 
creatureliness, our ultimate dependence upon God as a 
loving creator. As people of faith, we can be free from 
the anxiety that can cause humans to be "curved in" upon 
themselves, as Luther put it. Indeed, we can be liberated 
from our own quest for self-security and in this way we 
are available to consider the needs of our neighbors and 
the earth. Hence, people ought not to insulate their faith 
from the challenges and prospects of the world, since the 
gospel frees them to accept their creatureliness in and for 
the world. We also ought to be suspicious of any 
attempts to impose a "Christian worldview" on the world 
since we can never assume, this side of the eschaton, that 
our faith can somehow become sight. We walk, as St. 
Paul puts it, "by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor. 5:7). Faith 
indeed should seek to understand everything it is capable 
of understanding. Faith is seeking understanding, as St. 
Augustine taught us. Indeed, St. Augustine is right to 
note that far from faith making one blind, it is rather on 
account of faith that one can see or understand anything 
at all. However, furthering Augustinian thinking about 
the relationship between faith and understanding, Luther 
contended that genuine faith is bereft of empirical 
measuring. Indeed, faith must be content to find God 
under the "sign of the opposite," in suffering and the 
cross,5 rather than in security or triumphalistic glory, with 
which reason might feel more secure. Guided by a 
healthy suspicion in the ability of the power of human 
reason to determine or share a common home ground 
with divine truth as such, since it is vulnerable to the 
onslaught of the "labyrinthine depths of human self­
deception,"6 a Lutheran understanding of the gospel 
naturally can affirm dialogue as the best model for the 
relating or integrating of faith and learning, since 
dialogue especially can accommodate the ambiguity, or 
the lack of sight, that genuine faith must accept even as it 
seeks to make sense of its world. 
While historically the Lutheran tradition has tended to be 
"quietistic" with regard to the economic, political, and 
social "powers that be" that operate in the created order, 
and has rightly been chastised for this social passivity, 
there are certainly enough theological resources and 
leverages within Lutheranism, were Lutheranism to 
challenge its quietistic heritage. These powers are 
susceptible to self-serving incurvation, our tendency, as 
Luther put it, to be turned in upon ourselves. They 
should not be uncritically trusted. These powers can be 
instruments that further God's good creation, when they 
help us to focus on the needs of our neighbors or the 
earth. Nevertheless, they also are capable of systemic 
distortions when they become self-serving. With regard 
to education, Lutherans can especially walk freely 
because they know that education is not, and can never 
be, salvific. While education can help sustain social 
health, it can also be a vehicle of systemic distortions or 
social "incurvation." It is the gospel alone, then, that 
justifies the ungodly, not the processes or outcomes of 
education. From a Lutheran perspective, education does 
its job best when it directs us away from ourselves and 
toward the needs of our neighbors and the earth. 
Lutheran higher education holds out the prospect of being 
guided by awe and wonder towards the creation, rather 
than the fierce attempt to control nature for human's own 
purposes. We are, as Robert Jenson has nicely phrased it, 
to be gardeners of someone else's (i. e., God's) garden 
(Jenson 113). 
The wider academic context in the twentieth century has 
not always been amenable to the cultivation of a 
conversation between Athens and Jerusalem. The 
"liberal-rationalist" tradition, as Richard Baepler has 
designated it, has looked to the scientific method alone as 
a norm for authority and has configured the purpose of 
higher education to be primarily pragmatic in outlook. It 
discredits the role of faith in public matters; faith, then, is 
relegated to private matters. Lutheran higher education 
has responded in different ways to this academic 
tradition. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
(LCMS) schools, it could be argued, have generally opted 
for a "sectarian" strategy that rejects many, if not most, 
aspects of this tradition out of hand. ELCA schools, 
perhaps, have in various degrees and ways tended to 
accommodate this tradition. Much is to be learned from 
the liberal-rationalist tradition.7 We should affirm the use 
of scientific method and the important contributions that 
an individual's creative self-expression in the academy 
can offer the world. However, the overall record of the 
liberal-rationalist tradition is ethically ambiguous and 
some aspects of its outlook on the world are incompatible 
with the Christian gospel. The liberal-rationalist tradition 
rejects external authority and tradition, and affirms a 
"common rationality" that presumes that objectivity 
belongs solely to mathematics and the "hard sciences" of 
physics, chemistry, and possibly biology. It tends to 
reduce questions of truth to matters only of verification 
within the confines of controlled inquiry and 
demonstration. Since the attempt to specify an 
overarching common good is unobtainable to scientific 
pursuit, the liberal-rationalist tradition fosters a highly 
individualistic social policy. The self is "free" for any 
number of ends as long as it does not limit the autonomy 
for others. This tradition has altered the terrain for the 
kind of education offered in "denominational colleges," 
such as Lutheran schools which, as established in the 
nineteenth century, encouraged students to consider the 
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unity of knowledge, human moral purpose, societal 
leadership, and the classics of the West (Baepler 48). For 
the liberal-rationalist heritage, Athens and Jerusalem 
should not be in dialogue. Why? When seen as affecting 
the public, faith threatens to constrain the autonomous 
self. Furthermore, faith-lacking scientific verification­
is viewed by those espousing this tradition as largely an 
irrational matter. 
In an era of increasing pluralism, the hegemony of the 
liberal-rationalist tradition is less secure today than, say, 
twenty or thirty years ago. However, it is still a 
widespread and powerful social stance in the academy 
and it is fueled by the conviction that both scientific 
method as a path to truth (as opposed to "superstition") 
and personal autonomy ( as opposed to the heteronomy of 
hierarchical churchly and political authority) need to be 
preserved. Surely, the insight that this tradition offers for 
faith is that genuine faith must be on guard lest it become 
either superstitious or oppressively authoritarian. 
However, many scholars have rightly challenged a 
"verificationist" approach to truth that tends to pit science 
against faith. Indeed, the humanities are relegated to 
mere "taste" (about which, as the saying goes, there is no 
dispute) from the perspective of "verificationism." While 
verificationism has been widely discredited by many 
thinkers, in The Outrageous Idea of Christian 
Scholarship, George Marsden helpfully designates four 
specific objections to it. Since the liberal-rationalist 
tradition continues to wield considerable force in the 
academy, it is worthwhile to present Marsden's four 
points. First, the reliance on empirical scientific models 
as the specific criteria for truth is simply misguided since 
empirical science is not competent to provide definitive 
answers to the larger questions of life, which we should 
not assume to be properly configured as wholly 
subjective issues. Second, the conviction that all 
academic beliefs must be empirically based is 
inconsistent, a double-standard; "it [the empirical 
criterion] is not applied consistently to other 
nondemonstrable beliefs that play prominent roles in the 
secular academy." For instance, most academics believe 
in the value of equal treatment for all people regardless of 
gender or race. However, such a belief cannot be derived 
from scientific argument. Third, religious beliefs cannot 
be excluded from the academy since many "academics 
are religious" and their beliefs will inevitably shape some 
of their scholarship. And, finally, verificationism unduly 
favors scholarship based on purely naturalistic 
presuppositions. Scientific method has been widely 
successful in much of the natural sciences. It, however, is 
not itself scientifically self-verifying. 
In some perspectives, the liberal-rationalist approach to 
higher education may be less ethically neutral or innocent 
than it would lead us to believe. Indeed, as Max Weber 
conceived the goal of the university from its perspective, 
the university should seek mastery of the world through 
calculation and control (Schwehn 58). That goal, from 
the traditional Lutheran perspective, ought to be 
challenged. It would be tantamount to ambitatio 
divinitatis, the attempt of humanity to be its own god for 
itself. It is the exact opposite of living by faith. The 
results of our attempts at world mastery have 
consequences for the overall health of the planet as well 
as social, economic, and political inequities between rich 
and poor. ELCA schools can offer society far more by 
examining and challenging these aspects of the liberal­
rationalist tradition. Some aspects of this tradition, such 
as promoting free inquiry, are helpful and consistent with 
the mission of ELCA-related higher education. However, 
other aspects, such as its inherent individualism, run 
counter to the goals of ELCA higher education. 
Individualism undermines the attempt to develop a 
concern for vocational service to church, neighbor, and 
the earth. 
Ricoeur's Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Retrieval: A 
Challenge to the Liberal-Rationalist Tradition8 
The need for church-related higher education to move 
beyond the confines of the liberal-rationalist tradition 
motivates the concern of this paper to investigate and 
present the hermeneutical phenomenology of Paul 
Ricoeur (born 1913), and to draw out the implications of 
his philosophy for Lutheran higher education. Since the 
liberal-rationalist tradition is unsuited to provide a 
dialogical encounter between faith and learning for which 
Lutheranism quests, it then behooves us to seek an 
alternative model for education. Ricoeur is not an 
educational philosopher. Nevertheless, Ricoeur's 
development of a reflexive philosophy that seeks to 
interpret or rehear symbols, myths, and texts in terms of 
susp1c1on and retrieval, or "distanciation" and 
"appropriation," provides a model of dialogue with these 
symbols, myths, and texts, harmonious with and 
illustrative of how Lutheran higher education as itself 
dialogical can be construed. In Ricoeur' s work, issues of 
faith are seen as public matters, offering plausible 
perspectives on human identity, the nature of the good, 
and the nature of the world. Developed within a modem 
perspective, Ricoeur's work indicates that modernity 
need not entail secularity. Furthermore, Ricoeur's 
thinking unmasks a darker side to secularism that should 
not be ignored. This section of this essay will offer an in­
depth study of the development of Ricoeur' s approach to 
symbol, myth, metaphor, and narrative in order to reclaim 
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a space for the construal of faith and learning as 
dialogical, public, and worthwhile. 
Ricoeur' s hermeneutics grew out of his work as a 
reflexive philosopher working within the French 
phenomenological tradition; Ricoeur saw the role of 
philosophy as offering possibilities of an increased self­
understanding linked to the questions of a meaningful life 
and action. While himself a French Reformed Christian, 
he bracketed issues of faith in his philosophical pursuits 
in order to protect the integrity of both philosophy and 
theology.9 For Ricoeur, philosophy should not be an 
apologetic handmaid to theology, and theology should 
feel its freedom to position itself with relation to 
philosophy as it sees fit. His approach offered a self­
critique of the Reformed perspective on relating faith and 
reason, since he was not seeking to establish a Christian 
"worldview." Similar to the Lutheran position presented 
earlier, Ricoeur's work implies that faith offers 
philosophy not a worldview but a critical engagement 
upon its assumptions, methods, and intentions. Faith may 
be able to accommodate diachronically and perhaps 
synchronically a number of worldviews, but not every 
world view. The standard of testing a world view for 
Lutherans in light of Ricoeur' s views ought to be whether 
or not a given worldview is compatible with the 
cruciform existence of Christian discipleship, one which 
seeks to honor God above all things and seeks the 
neighbor's and the earth's well-being. An analysis of 
Ricoeur's intellectual journey, as we shall see, helps 
illustrate an intellectual basis for the viability of a 
dialogical approach to faith and learning, and how faith 
issues are genuinely public. 
The key to understanding Ricoeur' s view of dialogue is 
his analysis of a modem appropriation of mythical and 
symbolic thinking. Some modems tend to ridicule myth, 
but for Ricoeur myths hold the secret to some aspects of 
human experience, if we are willing to engage them 
dialogically. Early in his career, Ricoeur sought to 
extend the thinking of his teacher Edmund Husserl 10 by 
producing a phenomenological description of the human 
will.11 In order to attain the phenomenological standard 
of "pure description" or a transparency between the will 
s such and our conception of the will, Ricoeur initially 
··· acketed the experiences of fault and transcendence.
hen he undertook to study the notions of fallibility and
. It, however, he acknowledged the limitations of
ilsserl's approach to explain these phenomena.12 The
: usserlian perspective was far more comfortable with
Qtions like motives, powers, conditions, and limits
er than understanding how human fallibility is
pable of moving to fault. Ricoeur concluded that the
hdition of fallibility is due to the fact that for humans it
is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a proportion 
between desires and ends, or freedom and finitude. 
However, he determined that in order to understand fault, 
phenomenology needs to appeal to and then interpret the 
mythical tales of the origins of evil that pre-scientific 
peoples devised. 
In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur explored various 
myths that sought to interpret the origin of evil such as 
"primordial chaos," "primeval fall," "original 
defilement," "exile from paradise," and "tragic fate," 
culminating in the affirmation of a "servile will." In 
Ricoeur's view, such myths ironically were the attempt to 
make sense of something inherently irrational, the 
phenomenon of evil. Ricoeur' s insight was that finally it 
is only myth that can help us attempt to provide 
categories for philosophical reflection about evil. 
Ricoeur concluded that myth is a species of symbol-an 
extended or "narrated" symbol. Following Rudolf 
Bultmann13 but likewise much of modem thinking about 
mythology, he argued that myth must loose its 
explanatory pretension or presumed "etiological 
function." Nevertheless, Ricoeur contended that the 
quest to "demythologize" should not be to deprive us of 
myth, but instead to rid it of a "false logos" (Symbolism
of Evil 162), the illusion of offering a kind of crude 
"science." In this way, myth can thus affirm its 
exploratory significance, "its power of discovering and 
revealing the bond between man and what he considers 
sacred" (5). Or, as he stated it, ''The dissolution of the 
myth as explanation is the necessary way to the 
restoration of the myth as symbol" (350). Hence, in 
contrast to Husserlian phenomenology, meaning is not 
limited to the cognitive and empirical modes of 
understanding; it is rather profoundly hermeneutical, 14 an 
attempt to "listen" to the dimensions of experience that 
would, without myth or symbol, be "closed and hidden." 
Since much human behavior is symbolically construed, 
Ricoeur' s work opens vistas for philosophical and literary 
inquiry that are either closed or limited when we focus 
solely on concepts alone (as does Idealism) or sensations 
alone (as does Empiricism) to help us understand reality. 
Ricoeur contended that far from being irrational, as many 
in the liberal-rationalist tradition might claim, symbols 
provoke us to think. How are they capable of doing this? 
They do this because they are many-layered or 
"polysemic." For example, the symbol "defilement" 
conveys both a literal and a figurative connotation. The 
latter, an analogy, where defilement is like stain or spot, 
encourages our attempt to decipher just how similar in 
any given judgment the analogy holds. Hence, as 
Ricoeur so famously noted, "the symbol gives rise to 
thought." This is because the attempt to decipher 
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symbols is a thoroughly interpretive or hermeneutical 
enterprise. Ricoeur affirmed that the critical moment of 
modern thinking (the heart of the liberal-rationalist 
tradition) is a necessary and indispensable aspect of 
humanity's process of intellectual maturation. We have 
indeed "come of age," as Dietrich Bonhoeffer taught. 
However, we are not limited solely to the resources of 
this age. We can, and indeed should, "critique the 
critique" by recognizing modernity's limits and its 
tendency to inhibit our full understanding of reality or the 
exercising of our full range of human inquiry. Myth and 
symbol can continue to speak to us, if we are willing to 
listen to them. Hence, Ricoeur described the 
hermeneutical enterprise as a "wager"-a risk that pre­
modern symbols can still address us, disclose truth to us, 
and reveal possibilities of new experiences for us, despite 
the fact that they die as causal explanations for things 
(351). In this light, he claimed that it is not possible for 
us moderns to return, like pre-scientific peoples, to a 
"primitive naivete." However, by interpreting these 
symbols, we can hear their truths again. 
Ricoeur concluded that hermeneutics involves a circular 
process that can be thematized as: "We must understand 
in order to believe, but we must believe in order to 
understand." Faith will wager or risk the possibility that 
the symbol can still address the human by disclosing 
meanings that can help humans position themselves with 
regard to their relation in the cosmos and even to the 
sacred. Hermeneutics, in a sense, is an act of faith, 
though a kind of "secular" and not a specifically religious 
faith.15 It clearly is never a "blind faith." Rather, it is
more a faith like St. Augustine's who claims that apart 
from faith one cannot see. Symbols, then, encourage us 
to think as we attempt to decipher their meanings for 
people today.16 But thought also returns us back to the 
symbol, because we inescapably live within symbol 
systems. There is no metaphysical or scientific "second 
order" discourse that can dispense with the symbolic and 
mythic "first order" discourse. Since Ricoeur 
acknowledged that symbols can legitimate and sustain 
oppressive social systems, he listened carefully to the 
"masters of suspicion" such as Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud who unmasked idols used to justify social 
repression or inequities. Such idols must be smashed in 
order to allow symbols to speak (Freud and Philosophy 
532). An appropriate way in which to communicate to 
others about the truth of a symbol is then "attestation," 
which for Ricoeur has become the hermeneutical 
equivalent of certitude in other disciplines ( Oneself as 
Another 21). The upshot here for Lutheran higher 
education is that Ricoeur' s work allows a space for 
reflection to open about faith without the liberal­
rationalistic bias that faith is inherently non-cognitive. 
Ricoeur' s move from Husserlian phenomenology to 
hermeneutics, giving a public status to myth as an 
unavoidable symbolic form of human self-understanding 
and communication, provides a forum for faith matters to 
position certain aspects of human life, such as freedom, 
sin, origins, and destiny. It also suggests that the human 
quest for truth involved in asking these questions is 
meaningful, even though these questions transcend our 
finite ability to achieve definitive answers. In Lutheran 
terms, the purpose of education as dialogue is not to 
foster the life of the mind for its own sake but is guided 
by the possibility of nurturing a self-dispossessing life of 
discipleship. The primary symbol of the cross, in the 
Lutheran understanding, calls people to challenge idols 
which they invent in order to gain security and a false 
view of the self in which the self owns itself, and to live 
"outside themselves" in God and for the sake of the 
neighbor. 
Truth as Manifestation 
Having moved into hermeneutics, Ricoeur must 
undertake the difficult task of better understanding the 
ability of language to refer to extra-linguistic reality. For 
Ricoeur, truth is to be found as manifestation and not 
merely correspondence. Ricoeur inquired into the 
question of truth in language by investigating the 
semantic structure of referentiality in metaphor and 
narrative.17 In order to clarify his stance on language as 
referential, Ricoeur appealed to Gottlob Frege's linguistic 
distinction between "sense" and "reference." "Sense" 
semiotically conveys the intra-linguistic dimension of 
language-how words are to be distinguished from each 
other in the intelligibility of a sentence as such. The 
"reference," however, is the semantic dimension of 
language that indeed refers to extra-linguistic possibilities 
for human living in the world. Referentiality should no 
longer be construed, as the Structuralists conceived it, as 
solely an interplay among various signs within a text, nor 
as the Romantics construed it, as a reader's reproduction 
of an author's intentions. Instead, the text refers to 
reality by disclosing possible new horizons of experience 
for a reader.18 From this perspective, truth is radically 
reconceived, similar to the views of Martin Heidegger19 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer,20 as no longer an equivalence 
between an image in the mind and reality as such but as a 
disclosure of possible ways of living or new horizons of 
experience. 21 
Emphasizing the impqrtance of discourse as the avenue 
to truth-as-manifestation, Ricoeur' s work naturally turned 
in the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s to the question 
of narrative, particularly toward the question of 
establishing a relationship between narrative and time.22 
INTERSECTIONS/Summer 2004 
- 18 -
For Ricoeur, time is to be construed narratively as human 
time and narrative is to be construed as temporal 
experience. He isolated three hermeneutical moments to 
narrative: prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration. 
Our ability to prefigure our world means that we 
approach life with a preunderstanding of what human 
acting and communication are. Our ability to configure 
our world is our ability to "emplot," the act of "eliciting a 
pattern from a succession," that is, to configure episodic 
and unrelated temporal events into a meaningful totality. 
It is the text, not the reader, who projects a world and 
thus enlarges the reader.23 Our ability to re.figure our 
world is the ability to decipher the ethical possibilities in 
a situation suggested by the text. Education, from a 
Ricoeurian perspective, ought to be seen as itself a 
profoundly hermeneutical process as it exposes students 
to various traditions and canons of critical inquiry. 
Clearly, we can also infer from Ricoeur's hermeneutics 
that faith is capable of bearing on public matters by 
disclosing possibilities for how to reconfigure life in light 
of faith in the gospel and love towards one's neighbor. 
Truth is insight into the world and human relations, into 
new directions for human life, and into discerning God's 
will for humans; this reconception of truth parallels the 
Lutheran view of education both as dialogical, open to 
new horizons of experience, and as humble with regard to 
our attempts to comprehend reality. It also implies for 
Christians, in light of the power of the God who justifies 
the ungodly, the possibility of serving in new practices of 
charity in one's vocation on behalf of others and the 
earth. 
Ricoeur as Interpreter of Religion as a Dimension of 
Human Experience 
Ricoeur worked from within a "secular" framework. He 
did not see himself as a Christian apologist. Indeed, he 
bracketed issues of faith. Nevertheless, he criticized 
secularistic assumptions that tend to trivialize faith or 
actually repress questions of faith. His quest to retrieve 
questions and issues of mystery and myth was solely for 
the sake of unleashing the possibility of a more human 
and more humane humanity, a possibility which is 
lessened when the religious dimension to human 
experience is repressed or ignored. 24 In an important 
.article "Manifestation and Proclamation," he lamented 
that modernity "is constituted as modem precisely by 
:having moved beyond the sacred cosmos" (61). Hence, 
· �Modem persons no longer have a sacred space, a center,
templum, a holy mountain, or an axis mundi. Their
xistence is decentered, eccentric, a-centered."25 The
mifications of our domestication of nature and our de­
ystification of it through our adoption of scientific
ethod and our ubiquitous use of technology (the "real 
metaphysics of the twentieth century,"26 as Ernst Jilnger 
phrased it), is that "we no longer participate in a cosmos, 
but we now have a universe as the object of thought and 
as a matter to be exploited."27 It is the exposure of this 
hidden ideology of exploitation laden in much scientific 
and technological pursuit that led Ricoeur to note: "this 
same consideration ought to lead us to call into question 
the judgment modernity passes on what it makes appear 
as an archaism. This judgment in its tum has already 
begun to be judged itself. Modernity is neither a fact nor 
our destiny. It is henceforth an open question."28 
In a sense, for Ricoeur, the nature of the human is neither 
fully nor properly expressed apart from some kind of 
acknowledgment of the sacred. Technology's de­
mystification of the cosmos results not only in the "death 
of God," as it was expressed in the rnid-1960s, but also in 
the death of humanity. This is the darker side of 
secularity, which needs greater acknowledgement in the 
academy. When the participants in the universe are 
reduced to combinations of impersonal, albeit 
interconnected machinery, it is not only the universe as 
mysterious that dies, but also humanity as uniquely self­
transcendent. Humanity is properly self-constituted only 
within the horizon of mystery, wonder, awe, and joy, and 
certain human events such as births, deaths, or corning of 
age, are so evocative of both wonder and threat that only 
religious ritualization offers an etiquette that rightly 
responds to these mysteries. Ricoeur retrieved a sense of 
mystery to the cosmos by means of affirming the 
exploratory nature of myth, and the meaning-producing 
patterns of metaphor and narrative in order to help 
provide tools for better understanding our humanity and 
to critique the one-dimensional aspect of human interest 
that technology suggests. He also believed that while 
talk of faith is not susceptible to empirical testing (faith 
after all does not become sight)-nevertheless it is 
capable of being rationally configured. Like Immanuel 
Kant, Ricoeur was convinced that matters of faith can be 
thought, even if they can not be known. Far from 
violating one's personal autonomy, faith retrieves the 
possibility of allowing the human to be seen in non­
reductionist terms as personal and meaningful. For 
Ricoeur, the attempt to discern possible horizons of 
experience from a symbol or a text is a risk, a hope that 
being-as-such will or can give meaning to one's life by 
venturing or wagering that life-altering possibilities can 
be offered or given by the text or the symbol. Both the 
skeptic and the dogmatist short-circuit the possibility of 
hope because they think they can bring closure to the 
discussion prematurely. Neither position genuinely 
represents a stance of faith. However, a faith which can 
embrace questions, even doubts, fulfills our humanity and 
allows us to become ever more human in relation to God, 
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others, and our own very selves. Hopefully, a Lutheran 
understanding of the gospel in the context of higher 
education affirms this truth. 
The Contours and Value of Dialogue 
What then are the contours or texture of dialogue for 
Ricoeur? How can Athens and Jerusalem be in dialogue, 
if this is indeed what the dual citizen of Lutheran higher 
education desires? Ricoeur stresses that we need to 
check our modem anti-mythic assumptions and learn that 
some issues can only be understood mythically. We 
need, in other words, to take the risk of challenging 
ourselves and listening to the voice of the other in the 
myth. Likewise, Ricoeur teaches us to think through the 
new possible patterns of life suggested by various 
symbols. Symbols push us towards a "give and take" 
relationship between the other and ourselves. Narrative, 
for Ricoeur, asks us how our lives might be refigured in 
light of a story, implying a kind of attitude of open­
endedness as we inquire how a text may alter our lives. It 
seems, then, that there are four crucial components to a 
phenomenology of dialogue on the basis of our 
investigation of Ricoeur' s hermeneutics and theory of 
narrative: risk, listening, mutuality (give and take), and 
open-endedness. These four are not to be understood in 
either a temporal or a hierarchical sequence. However, 
they do represent the phenomenological contours or 
texture of authentic dialogue. First, when interpreters 
approach a text or a symbol they must take the risk in 
hopefulness and faith to venture that this symbol can 
indeed continue to speak. The symbol of course may in 
some sense deceive. The symbol or text may, for 
instance, authorize or legitimate repression. Ricoeur 
would have us test or question this of the symbol or text. 
It may provide some kind of "false logos" that would 
seek to explain reality in a quasi-scientific way. He 
would have us challenge our assumptions about the 
symbol or text. We need to be suspicious and yet hopeful 
of retrieval as we undergo our suspicion. The hermeneut 
falls short of certitude, yet not of thought. Second, the 
hermeneut is a listener. Hermeneutics allows the symbol 
or text to question us, to challenge us, to provoke us, to 
permit us to question and test our deepest convictions and 
assumptions. It is risky business indeed! It is an 
interplay between exclusion and embrace, distance and 
closeness, suspicion and retrieval, skepticism and 
attestation. It is in this way that we listen to the text or 
symbol-even as we question it. We ask: How might it 
refigure our lives and make us different or hold out new 
possibilities for us? Third, the fact that we stand between 
suspicion and retrieval and reject both skepticism and 
dogmatism guarantees that our task of interpretation, our 
analysis of the possibilities of life reconfigured by the 
text or symbol, will be a process of mutual give and take, 
and hence, fourth, an open-endedness due to the "surplus 
of meaning" in a text. Demythologization does not have 
to lead to demystification or demythication. Indeed, even 
scientific method in Ricoeur' s perspective, should be 
understood as likewise a hermeneutical task, the 
interpretation of data and experience in light of models 
which attempt a "critical realism," a possible, imaginative 
way of representing the world. Ricoeur, like C. S. Lewis, 
teaches Christians to affirm the mythic character of their 
primary narratives. Gary Dorrien, interpreting Lewis 
says, "If the Christ myth is true in the way that it claims 
to be true, it stands to other myths as the fulfillment of 
their promise and truth. It is not an illustration of mythic 
truth, but the ground of its possibility and the realization 
of its fragmentary glimpse of the Real"29 In this regard, 
Lutherans need, at times, to look to the work of Thomas 
Aquinas as a model in the art of Christian dialogue. 
While risking his own faith by bearing the brunt of some 
incompatible aspects of Aristotelianism with orthodox 
Christian faith, Aquinas was also able to discern various 
degrees of truth in Aristotle that he believed Christians 
must appropriate. Likewise, contemporary Christians 
will look to thinkers as diverse as Stephen Hawking and 
the Buddha in their quest for truth, even though these 
thinkers will challenge Christian faith while giving great 
insights about life and the world. 
What then does Ricoeur have to teach us about the value 
of dialogue for church-related education? In Ricoeur's 
perspective, issues of faith can engage the public arena; 
they are no longer positioned by the "liberal-rationalist" 
tradition. A dialogical approach to faith deals with public 
matters by allowing scholars to reflect on religious 
symbols and narratives with an eye to their impact upon 
public life. In the context of the church-related college, 
this discussion allows for how Christian narratives might 
suggest new horizons of interpreting experience. It 
should be clear that dialogue about matters of faith and 
public life sometimes takes the voice of argument and 
criticism. For both Lutherans and Ricoeurians, the 
Christian scholar must often internalize important 
criticisms of the Christian tradition made from outside 
the tradition and seek to defend or revise the stance of 
Christian faith. However, at other times, both Lutherans 
and Ricoeurians recognize that the Christian scholar must 
unmask secularity as itself offering an alternative faith 
stance in opposition to and certainly no more justifiable 
than Christianity. With dialogue, the Christian scholar 
will seek to be as charitable as possible to the stances of 
the non-Christian and extra-theological disciplines. Even 
ethicists, in a sense, can teach chemistry, since the 
attitudes they express about the discipline of chemistry 
and how chemicals are best used offer important ideas for 
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students to wrestle with. Since Christian scholars 
recognize the world as God's world, even though this 
truth is not universally acknowledged, they will seek to 
build as many bridges as are possible with non-Christian 
faith stances and extra-theological disciplines. They will 
risk, listen, seek mutuality, and open-endedness in their 
quest. Some features of the Christian perspective, 
however, will remain non-negotiable in this discussion. 
Christians might deliberate about how to accomplish 
practices of peace in the world. However, they will not 
debate the truth that peace is a goal that ought to be 
achieved. In the Lutheran perspective, the scholar as a 
Christian disciple will build such bridges between 
disciplines and amongst people in order to be Christ to 
and serve the "neighbor" in the context of the academy. 
Both accomodationist and sectarian strategies towards 
modernity short circuit dialogue, since they tend to 
collapse the dialogue to a monologue, over-prioritizing 
only one voice of the conversation. Lutheran higher 
education will be best served when it charts a path 
between these extremes. Lutheran higher education can 
fulfill this task because it expresses the freedom. to 
transgress boundaries established by Weberian 
orthodoxies in the academy. Instead of favoring the 
Weberian prioritization of instrumental reason and its 
concomitant "fact-value" split, the pedagogy of Lutheran 
higher education will sustain itself by raising those 
irrepressible questions about human destiny, purpose, and 
service to God and neighbor. 
Conclusion 
Again, why should the church support institutions of 
higher learning? How can the church fulfill its mission 
through them? We might be tempted to think that the 
attempt to establish a "Christian worldview" would be 
the best answer to this question. However, following 
both Luther's and Ricoeur' s thinking, it is clear that 
simply because a scholar uses "Christian" data or 
attempts to devise a "Christian" method for seeking truth, 
a "Christian" worldview is not guaranteed. However, is 
not the attempt to establish such a worldview 
presumptuous, in light of the gospel? Our faith will 
· · become sight at the eschaton-but only at the eschaton.
This side of eternity, we need to be very humble in how 
we relate faith to learning. Our construction of models of 
reality, even within theology, fail isomorphically to 
correspond to reality. The Lutheran position of 
attempting to establish a dialogue between faith and 
learning honors the ambiguity that men and women of 
faith actually experience in their current pilgrimage. 
Nevertheless, worldviews will be constructed, especially 
within the academy. Christians should join in the task of 
building them. To the conversation, they will bring a 
"discretion of spirits" (1 John 4: l); they will raise 
questions of how the ultimate or God is named and 
served, how the neighbor's needs are met, and how 
stewardship of the earth is best done. The Lutheran quest 
to establish this dialogue is a vigorously Christian, albeit 
a humble, endeavor. The Lutheran educational insights 
that ( l) dialogue between faith and learning is an 
appropriate endeavor, (2) the world can be affirmed as an 
arena of creative, spiritual activity, and (3) self-critique is 
important in all our activities, can be furthered as we 
have seen, by an encounter with Ricoeur' s hermeneutics 
of suspicion and retrieval, the plausibility of myth as 
disclosing truth, and the attempt to dialogue with the 
other. 
The Lutheran church 1s a confessional church. 
Throughout its symbolic writings we encounter the 
phrase "we believe, teach, and confess." In the school, 
the church risks her confessional heritage. She is willing 
to bracket it in order to listen to critiques and to discern 
how to engage the gospel with the life of the mind. This 
endeavor is a necessary venture, if Christians are to 
continue their earthly pilgrimage in faith in God and in 
service toward the neighbor. In the academy, the 
contemporary Christian is no different than Abraham 
who hears and obeys God's call, not knowing where he 
or she will arrive. This legacy is worth our while to 
transmit to our youth and also to model before the world. 
In light of the inroads of the liberal-rationalist tradition in 
ELCA schools, the challenge for many of our colleges 
will be to create a space for this unique dialogue to occur. 
One might well wager that those institutions which seek 
to retrieve this calling will find their academic journey 
adventurous, rewarding, and true to their calling. 
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Notes 
1 L. DeAne Lagerquist has shared with me the insight that for many Lutherans, the Lutheran tradition in higher education functions as
a compass that orients our outlook on the world and not a map that would seek a totalizing perspective. 
2 In his article "Philosophy and the Unity of Truth," Ricoeur claims "If all history engenders a degree of skepticism, every claim to 
truth fosters a degree of dogmaticism. From this point of view, history would only be a history of errors and truth would be the 
suspension of history." See History and Truth, trans. C. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 42. 
3 The following discussion is dependent on Richard T. Hughes and William B. Adrian's Models for Christian Higher Education: 
Strategies for Success in the Twenty-First Century (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997). 
4 See Ernest L. Simmons, Lutheran Higher Education: An Introduction for Faculty (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 31. 
5 Hence in The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer and 0. R. Johnston (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1957), 101, Luther wrote, 
" . . .  faith's object is things not seen. That there may be room for faith, therefore, all that is believed must be hidden. Yet it is not 
hidden more deeply than under a contrary appearance of sight, sense and experience. Thus, when God quickens, He does so by killing; 
when he justifies, He does so by pronouncing guilty; when he carries up to heaven, he does so by bringing down to hell." Consider 
also Luther's 20th thesis of the Heidleberg Disputation: "He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the 
visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross." 
6 See Richard Baepler, "Toward an Understanding of Lutheran Character in Higher Education" in The Lutheran Reader, ed. by Paul J. 
Contino and David Morgan (Valparaiso: Valparaiso University Press, 1999), 50. 
7 I am adapting the categories "sectarian" and "accomodationist" from Ronald Thiemann's categorization of strategies among 
churches for dealing with secular critique of religion from modernity. See his Religion in Public Life: A Delimma for Democracy 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 55. 8 I am grateful for Bruce Reichenbach' s perceptive critique of this section of this essay, which pushed me to connect with greater rigor
Ricoeur's approach to dialogue with that of Lutheran higher education. 
9 Hence, in Oneself as Another [trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992)] Ricoeur claims that "It 
will be observed that this asceticism of the argument, which marks, I believe, all my philosophical work, leads to a type of philosophy 
from which the actual mention of God is absent and in which the question of God, as a philosophical question, itself remains in a 
suspension that could be called agnostic" (24). He also argues, "The reference of biblical faith to a culturally contingent symbolic 
network requires that this faith assume its own insecurity, which makes it a chance happening transformed into a destiny by means of 
a choice constantly renewed, in the scrupulous respect of different choices. The dependence of the self on a word that strips it of its 
glory, all the while comforting its courage to be, delivers biblical faith from the temptation, which I am here calling 
cryptophilosophical, of taking over the henceforth vacant role of ultimate foundation" (25). He goes on to cite Eberhard Jungel's anti­
foundationalist approach to theology as a convincing and winsome theological method. 10 For an examination of Husserl's philosophy, see his Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce
Gibson (New York: Collier, 1962), Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), and Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl 
Americks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
11 See Ricoeur's Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans. E. V. Kobak (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1966). For studies of Ricoeur's thinking, see Don Ihde's Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), David Wood, ed. On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation (London: 1991), 
Charles E. Reagan, Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), T. Peter Kemp and David 
Rasmussen, eds. The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricoeur (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), David Klemm, The 
Hermeneutical Theory Of Paul Ricoeur: A Constructive Analysis (London: Bucknell University Press, 1983), and David Klemm and 
William Schweiker, eds. Meanings in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1993). 
12 See Fallible Man, trans. Charles A Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), xlii. 13 In "Preface to Bultmann," published in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, ed. Lewis S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 49-72,
Ricoeur criticizes Bultmann for jumping too quickly from kerygma to faith; one should not bypass the question of language's ability 
to reconfigure our lives. 
14 Ricoeur defined the task of the hermeneutics as twofold: "to reconstruct the internal dynamic of the text and to restore to the work 
its ability to project itself outside itself in the representation of a world that I could inhabit." See "On Interpretation" in From Text to 
Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans. Kathleen Blarney and John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 
18. 15 Hence in Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 28,
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Ricoeur concludes "The contrary of suspicion, I will say bluntly is faith. What faith? No longer, to be sure, the first faith of the simple 
soul, but rather the second faith of one who has engaged in hermeneutics, faith that has undergone criticism, postcritical faith." 
16 Here Ricoeur's Kantianism can be seen at its clearest. Ricoeur's notion of "symbols" is comparable to Kant's notion of "aesthetic 
ideas," ideas for which no concept is adequate. Kant describes this category in his Third Critique which, unlike the First Critique 
which deals with knowledge or the Second Critique which deals with desire, deals with judgment, specifically the attempt to establish 
regulative, a priori, non-constitutive principles that can help us understand both our aesthetic judgments and our teleological approach 
to nature. For Kant's discussion of "aesthetic ideas" see The Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafuer, 1951), 
157. 
17 In order to affirm a referential dynamic to language he countered the structuralist perspective on language, popular among French 
intellectuals during the mid-twentieth century. Structuralism reduced language to a finite system of signs whose significance is 
determined by differences among the signs themselves and not from the signs' ability to refer to extra-linguistic reality as such. 
Ricoeur was troubled that in the structuralist perspective language is no longer treated as a "form of life," as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
would call it, but as a "self-sufficient system of inner relationships." Ricoeur's major criticism of structuralism was that "Language is 
not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we 
orient ourselves comprehensively in those situations, we have something to say, we have experience to bring to language." See 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 20-21. 
18 As Ricoeur noted: "What has to be appropriated is the meaning of the text itself, conceived in a dynamic way as the direction of 
thought opened up by the text. In other words, what has to be appropriated is nothing other than the power of disclosing a world that 
constitutes the reference of the text." See Interpretation Theory, 92. 
19 According to Heidegger an artwork "sets up" a world. See ''The Origin of a Work of Art" in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. 
Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971), 44. 20 Truth and Method (New York Continuum, 1975), 273.
21 Hence, Ricouer claims "Far from saying that a subject already mastering his own way of being in the world projects the a priori of 
his self-understanding on the text and reads it into the text, I say that interpretation is the process by which disclosure of new modes of 
being-or if you prefer Wittgenstein to Heidegger, of new forms of life-gives to the subject a new capacity for knowing himself. If the 
reference of the text is the project of a world, then it is not the reader who primarily projects himself. The reader rather is enlarged in 
his capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself." See Interpretation Theory, 94. Mark I. Wallace 
further clarifies Ricoeur's position on understanding with the statement that it "occurs in the to-and-fro dialogue between text and 
interpreter whenever the interpreter is willing to be put into question by the text and risk openness to the world of possibilities the text 
projects." See "Introduction" to Ricoeur's Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer and ed. 
Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 9. 
22 See his magisterial Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1984, 1984, 1988). 23 In his last major work, Oneself as Another, Ricoeur explores ethics from his narrative perspective. He argues that the question of
personal identity should be constructed as ipseity, the quest to give intelligibility to one's life by means of composing one's own 
narrative about the self and not idem, the notion of the self as same. Hence, the self is best seen as developed by means of dialectic 
between self and the other than the self. 24 See "Manifestation and Proclamation" in Figuring the Sacred. 25 Ibid.
26 See John Wilkinson's "Introduction" to Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage, 
1964), ix. 
27 Ibid, 61-62. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See The Word as True Myth: Interpreting Modern Theology (Louisville: Westminster, 1997), 237. 
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